Two Theses On The AMIA Massacre

Though the AMIA massacre occurred on July 18th, 1994 the official commemoration of its sixteenth anniversary took place on the 16th. In these two stories covering the events that took place you’ll find Guillermo Borger, head of the AMIA community organization. the one directly affected by the attack, praising the “good performance” of the present administration with regard to the investigation into the attack and lauding Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s “bravery” in calling for the extradition of the Iranian fugitives in her speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

1.

Until the Argentine Jewish community produces leaders more concerned with seeking justice for the victims of the AMIA massacre than winning favor with a government which, though it has done more than its predecessors to investigate the attack,  has been to careful to send signals to the Iranian regime that, the annual charade at the UN notwithstanding, it has nothing to worry about regarding the call for the extradition of the suspects it’s sheltering, then there will be no justice for the AMIA victims.

2.

Until the Argentine Jewish community produces leaders that have enough moral backbone not to describe the present government as “brave” when it refuses to i) to break diplomatic relations with Iran, ii) criminalize tangible and verbal support for Hezbollah and the current Iranian regime (why not, when denial of the Jewish and Armenian genocides are already criminal offenses?), iii) itself cease to provide tangible support for Iran in the form of continuing trade relations, and (iv) actively campaign in every forum open to it for Iran to be pressurized into  extraditing the suspects, that means never failing to bring  the matter up at the numerous international organizations of which Argentina is a member and in which it enjoys well-earned (on some issues)  prestige on matters relating to human rights; until then there will be no justice for the AMIA victims.

A brief footnote. The argument usually outlined for not pursuing such a course of action as that suggested in Thesis 2 is, believe it or not, that it would provoke the Iranians into carrying out  another attack. To give a brief contrasting example; with regard to its dispute over the Falkands/Malvinas with the government of the UK, Argentina places restrictions on the movements of British shipping in some of  its ports and the movements of British commercial and military aviation  in some of its airspace, it  seeks support for its position in international forums and, at its behest, the leaders of  some of its neighbors regularly make statements in support of its position. No one seems to think these measures might lead to MI6 organizing the mass murder of Argentine citizens.

Oh and compare and contrast with Argentina’s attitudes and actions  with regard to Iran and the AMIA fugitives.

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