1.

Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff point to an aspect of the Free Gaza Flotilla that hasn’t received the attention it should,

In the approaching clash, the complex system of alliances and counter-alliances of the Middle East is beginning to emerge. It does not appear to be coincidental that the Islamist governing party in Turkey is involved, behind the scenes, in dispatching the flotilla, in coordination with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. At the same time it is doubtful that it is coincidental that the Israel Air Force held this week exercises with Greece, the traditional rival of Turkey, of the sort that two years ago were carried out mostly in Turkey.

2.

The editorial writer of the same paper shows no interest in the strategy of other actors in the conflict and goes for a simpler approach,

… the Israeli government knows exactly the price it must pay to free Shalit. It has already conducted indirect negotiations with Hamas and even announced that it was willing to release a large number of prisoners who are members of the Islamic group. The deal has been held up due to a number of prisoners who committed extremely serious crimes whom Israel refuses to release. Israel’s firm refusal to free those prisoners is becoming its most costly move so far.

There seems to me to be a basic misunderstanding about the meaning of the term “negotiation” here. While most people understand it to refer to a process with an uncertain outcome in which both parties attempt to make the fewest concessions possible while extracting the most from their rival, Haaretz seems to understand  it as one in which Israel receives its enemy’s wish list and immediately concedes to it in full. Any other approach is seen as a sign of intransigence and bad faith on Israel’s part.

3.

Relations with Turkey have deteriorated significantly due to Israel’s policy in Gaza.

To see Israel’s Gaza policy as the sole determinant of the quality of its relations with Turkey you have  to ignore any possible changes in the attitude of Turkey to Israel that arise from shifts in Turkish politics.  I’d say that at least as influential in the chilling of Ankara’s attitude to Israel were the governing AK Party’s  gradual hollowing out of the institutions of the Kemalist republic and the broader Ottomanization of its foreign policy.

4.

Israel could probably be more flexible about the amount and type of goods it allows into Gaza without benefiting Hamas. Beyond that, it’s hard to see what good policy options it has. If it releases all the prisoners Hamas is asking for in return for Shalit it will be offering an even greater incentive for future kidnappings and it certainly won’t win any brownie points from Ankara or anywhere else.  If it drops the naval blockade it gives the opportunity for Hamas to import whatever it likes into the territory. Again, those who imagine that such a move would lead to a sudden surge in Israel’s popularity abroad are living in cloud cuckoo land.  Apart from the question of Shalit, I’ve no doubt that Israel already negotiates indirectly with Hamas on matters related to the management of the conflict and  the odd rocket fired into Israel and the occasional bombing of a tunnel by the IAF form part of those negotiations.

However, when Haaretz editorials writers and those with similar views urge Israel to negotiate with Hamas I get the feeling they’re talking about some other kind of process, one in which Israel would be expected to take seriously and make real concessions to the political ambitions of the organization that currently rules the Gaza Strip in a manner recently described as fascist by the PA’s Foreign Minister.