Paul Rogers here speculates about the possibility of Iran testing a basic nuclear device before its presidential election in June.

Choice quote:

On the nuclear weapon issue, Iran looks to India and Pakistan as existing nuclear powers with regional prestige, and even more so to North Korea where the acquisition of a minimal nuclear arsenal has increased the country’s bargaining position. At a time of potential engagement with the United States, it can readily be argued that a small-scale nuclear demonstration would make Washington far more likely to engage in substantial negotiations, weakening Israel’s influence with the Obama administration as well as its regional standing. Perhaps more significant is the value of such a test in diverting public attention away from the formidable problems of the domestic economy. This might be more likely if Mr Ahmadinejad wins the election in June, but might also apply to another President, given that it is the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is dominant in matters concerned with security and foreign policy. There is some risk that the decision to build and test a device before June’s election has been taken, primarily to increase Mr Ahmadinejad’s popularity and help ensure victory.

With regard to Israel’s possible reaction to such a development Rogers says that,

The central factor is that the Netanyahu government has made the Iranian nuclear programme such a core part of its security posture that to do nothing in the face of an Iranian nuclear test would severely affect its credibility. For this reason alone, it is likely that there would be a military response. A key issue would then be whether the Obama administration would countenance Israeli air movements across Iraq, bearing in mind that Israeli has the military capacity only to delay an Iranian nuclear weapons programme, not irreversibly destroy it.

The fact that Israel doesn’t have the ability to “irreversibly destroy” Iran’s nuclear weapons program doesn’t add anything to the argument because as long as Iran retains its independence the possibility of rebuilding a seriously damaged program would always remain. This would still be the case if it were to be attacked with much greater force than Israel possesses and would remain so even in the fantasy scenario of Iran being conquered and occupied; sooner or later the occupation would end and they could renew their attempts to become a nuclear power. The issue, therefore,  is not whether Iran’s nuclear ambitions could be permanently thwarted by an Israeli air strike, it is rather whether such a setback could be inflicted on them  as to justify the grave risks involved in launching the attack.

And then there is this:

From Washington’s perspective, Israeli military action would almost certainly be guaranteed to ensure Iranian determination to develop an operational nuclear arsenal as quickly as possible.

This assumes that such determination does not already exist and is unfair to the Iranian regime in that it supposes that it is currently only toying with the idea of becoming a nuclear power  and that the  mooted detonation of a basic, unweaponized device would be not much more than a glorified electioneering stunt.

In taking this view Rogers falls into a trap that catches out many commentators on Middle East affairs. This consists of seeing states and organizations other than Israel as only having a weak form of political and strategic agency; whatever actions they take are fundamentally reactive in nature and, regardless of how unadvisable they might be, they can’t be held fully responsible for them as they did not freely decide to take them.

This view sees Israel as being possessed of a kind of superior political and strategic agency; not only   is it fully responsible for everything it does itself but also at least partly responsible for whatever its adversaries do.