The English version is here:
http://www.barcelonametropolis.cat/en/page.asp?id=21&ui=224

Amongst other observations of interest, Margalit comments the following: “There are, then, examples of societies that are relatively decent to their own members but that behave indecently towards others. Does that mean, though, that the society in question is indecent? I’d say no.”

Thanks for your blog.

This is Haber’s own little thought experiment.

Why do you assume they wouldn’t?

(Although…in the case of Maalot, as well as in similar stand-offs around the world, including Waco, TX. one cannot discount other motivating factors; national pride, police prestige, faulty intelligence, etc.)

Of course, these examples are not really parallel to the situation in Gaza. But consider the following: both in the Gaza war and in Southern Lebanon, Hamas and Hizbollah used Palestinians as human shields. According to Yadlin and Kasher, while some consideration should be given to this, it is justifiable to bomb a terrorist if that will result in the death of human shields (the IDF bombed a high-ranking Hamas leader and killed many members of his family, inclduing children) — that is covered by the “military necessity” rubric.

Now I am waiting for McDonagh’s historical example of an Israeli operation in which, in order to kill a terrorist, the Israelis bombed their own civilians. If the justification for such bombing is “military necessity” — and that is the justification — then there should be no difference in the ethnic identity of the human shields, or at least so argue W and M.

That is the issue at hand; that is the point that divides the sides, and that still seems to elude McDonagh.

By the way, as I mention on my website, Kasher and Yadlin did not respond to the NYRB piece, but to the W and M Haaretz piece published on the Seventh Day of Passover. But I suspect that W and M got wind of the K and Y response before the NYRB. Because although K and Y claim that in the thought experiment of the kibbutz, the kibbutz would be in territory under effective Israeli control (and hence would call for a police, rather than a military operation), W and M, in the NYRB piece, explicitly say that the kibbutz captured by Hizbollah forces would be under Hizbollah’s effective control. The question of effective control is a pivotal one for Yadlin and Kasher.

If anyone, apart from Haber, is aware of a reliable English translation of these texts, I’d be glad to directed to them.

2.
“McDonagh doesn’t get W and M. He seems to think that they are saying that there is no difference in fighting terrorists or regular armies. Rather, their point is that if the other side had a regular army, K and Y’s point would be the same: there is a priority of our soldiers over their civilians. And in their response K and A show no sign that they disagree.”

Kasher and Yadlin do not give an absolute priority to “our” soldiers over “their” civilians and if my citation from their paper isn’t enough to make that clear I’m not sure what might do the trick.

3.
“But K and Y clearly say that the IDF bears no responsibility for civilian casualities because they have no effective control in Gaza; that civilian casualties are entirely the fault of Hamas (and, in some cases, the civilians themselves.)”

There’s nothing to justify this characterization of Kasher and Yadlin’s views in their paper.
4.
At no point do I say that Israel’s natural instinct to favor its own provides a legal or moral justification for any particular course of action. Margalit and Walzer, in their thought experiment, are the ones betting the farm on the consideration given by Israelis to their own kin as they seem to think that if similar consideration were extended to Arabs, they would be more likely to be protected from harm. I believe that my historical examples give reason to doubt this.

http://themagneszionist.blogspot.com/2009/04/michael-walzers-proxy-war-against-jeff.html

The partial defense by Eamonn McDonagh above does not refer to Kasher and Yadlin’s own defense of their position against Margalit and Walzer’s criticism, which has appeared so far only in Hebrew (as far as I know.) That’s a pity, because in several cases Kasher and Yadlin do not dispute Walzer and Margalit’s reading.

So, for example, McDonaghon says that “[Kasher and Yadlin] maintain a clear distinction between combatants and civilians,” whereas in their response to W and M, the two write, “We do not have a principle of distinguishing different types of people. That is Walzer’s approach, which distinguishes between non-combatants, who are in the category of sacred people that cannot be touched, and soldiers, whose blood is permitted, because they are in the category of those who have conceded their right to freedom and life.”

Because McDonagh misses the central point of the debate between the two sides, his interpretative comments are of less interest in understanding it. But not entirely, because they do point out some misunderstandings of both sides. Rather than get stuck on exegesis, let me focus on those.

Misunderstanding 1.

W and M had said that K and Y’s argument for the priority of our side’s soldiers over their side’s civilians didn’t make a difference where their civilians are in the vicinity of terrorists (as in Gaza) or soldiers (as, say, in a war against Syria). K and Y in their response *agree* with W and M; under both circumstances, the issue would be whether the territory is under our effective control or not.

McDonagh doesn’t get W and M. He seems to think that they are saying that there is no difference in fighting terrorists or regular armies. Rather, their point is that if the other side had a regular army, K and Y’s point would be the same: there is a priority of our soldiers over their civilians. And in their response K and A show no sign that they disagree.

This is not to say — and W and M never said — that A and K don’t think that the IDF should try to minimize civilian casualities. But A and K clearly say that the IDF bears no responsibility for civilian casualities because they have no effective control in Gaza; that civilian casualties are entirely the fault of Hamas (and, in some cases, the civilians themselves.)

Misunderstanding 2. The thought experiment.

The purpose of a thought experiment is to test our intuitions and principles. The purpose of M and W’s thought experiment was to argue that the IDF should act no differently whether civilians in the vicinity of enemy combatants are Israeli or not.

Now, K and Y disagree with this principle. And so does McDonagh. He simply states as a fact that “Israel, just like every other country, values its own more than foreigners.” Oh, how true, and oh, how irrelevant to Walzer and Margalit. Because they are saying that Just War theory requires an ironclad distinction between soldiers and non-combatants. To explain why this is so is beyond the scope of this comment — but Kasher and Yadlin get the point, and McDonagh doesn’t.

Then McDonagh continues

“Israel has repeatedly shown itself willing to place its own civilians at risk through its own actions in order to protect them from greater risks imposed on them by their enemies. Sometimes this has worked out well and sometimes it hasn’t; think about Ma’alot and Entebbe.”

But what relevance does this have? Any country, or for that matter, any police force, may be in a situation where to save people, a risky rescue operation has to be executed. The issue at hand is whether Israel is quicker to risk its soldiers for its own civilians than for its enemies. The answer maybe, “Of course, that is natural for any state.” To which M and W may say, “Natural, yes. Moral, no.”

Once again, I point out that M and W’s position is not above argument, and in some respects it is counter-intuitive — but it is based on standard Just War theory. Kasher and Yadlin’s is not, although they claim it is. And Jeff McMahon tries to argue against standard Just War theory.