Hamas has declared that it has no interest in renewing the ceasefire with Israel that expires today and that effectively ended some weeks ago anyway. The situation with which Israel is now presented is a very complex one.

Its enemies in Gaza have evidently used the last two years to increase their military capabilities and seem confident that they can respond effectively to any Israeli initiative while continuing to bombard Sderot and surrounding areas with rockets.

There follows a list of some of the possibilities open to Israel now.

1.

Undertake no new initiative while continuing to strike at launch cells from the air. This policy probably lowers the rate at which rockets can be launched but it doesn’t erode the basic will or ability of Hamas to launch them. A further factor to bear in mind is that Hams seems willing to absorb the casualties it is currently suffering without feeling the need to extend its attacks deeper into Israel.

So, the current limited exchanges could continue for a considerable period of time while Hamas continues to expand its military capabilities.

2.

Israel could launch a limited land operation against Hamas. Such an operation would be more extensive than existing cross-border raids aimed at limiting Hamas operations near the fence but would not be aimed at a return to a long-term occupation of a significant area of Gaza.

The problem with such an operation is that it would produce all, or most, of the costs of conquering Gaza with few of the possible benefits. As soon as the IDF crosses the border in force, the number of rockets fired into Israel will quickly increase and longer range ones would be fired as well. If any of them caused mass casualties in Israel, the political pressure to “do something” from the Israel public would almost certainly lead to the limited operation being hurriedly converted into a more general one.

Furthermore, Hamas has had more than two years to prepare for major Israeli land operations against it. It must be assumed that this time has been well spent and they have plans in place that would allow them to inflict heavy casualties on the IDF in the initial stages of any operation. It’s hard to think of any justification for the sustaining of such casualties for what would only be an extended raid, the damage and losses produced by which Hamas would quickly recover from.

3.

There is also the possibility of a limited operation to reoccupy the frontier with Egypt. The costs of such an operation would likely be very substantial, both for the IDF and the people of Gaza living near the frontier. A successful operation of this kind would offer the important prize of sharply reducing Hamas’s ability to import weapons through tunnels but it would have no long-term effect on the firing of rockets into southern Israel and the number of rockets fired would most likely increase, especially in the early stage of the operation. A reoccupation of the frontier with Egypt might also complicate relations with that country and would at least partially close a significant supply route for the hard-pressed population of Gaza.

4.

For all the time that Hamas has had to prepare itself and an all the ingenuity and self-sacrifice of its fighters, Israel has it within its power to conquer Gaza and overthrow its present government. A lot of blood would have to be spilled in the process and it would require an iron political will in the prime minister’s office to see it through successfully but it could be done.

Conquering Gaza would offer the prize of overthrowing a government dedicated to Israel’s destruction and deeply hostile to Jews everywhere. The problems would begin the day after. Rockets would continue to fall on southern Israel, though in smaller numbers than before, and Israel would be responsible for the civil administration of Gaza. Could Fatah be persuaded to take the reins in Gaza if Israel were to topple Hamas? Would it be able to sustain itself in power if it did? Impossible to say but it doesn’t seem likely anytime soon.

A further relevant point is that while it might be possible to persuade Israeli public to support the conquest of Gaza and overthrow of Hamas, it seems unlikely that it would back a long term presence in Gaza, with the inevitable casualties that this would produce, even if this is what is necessary to prevent Hamas growing stronger and to reduce rocket fire.

5.

Israel could also continue with option 1 but with an important addition. It could set about systematically assassinating Hamas’s political and military leadership in Gaza and wherever else it can be found. The Hamas operatives who launch rockets into Israel and fire small arms at Israelis going about their lawful business on the other side of the fence can be relatively easily replaced. The same is not true of leaders. Men of courage, judgment and charisma do not abound in any community.

Israel’s targeted killing of certain individuals among its enemies is sometimes treated as it if were a particularly abominable practice. This view is the expression of a kind of moral cretinism. If you are a pacifist and object to the use of force in general, then that’s fair enough, you have the right to object to targeted killings too. If, however, you allow that conventional warfare - with its very broad limits on how and when the enemy may be killed - can be justified in certain circumstances then you are in no position to raise objections to the assassination of particular individuals. Daniel Statman sets out the philosophical arguments justifying this view here.

It may be further objected that there is something wrong with killing elected representatives or political, as opposed to military, leaders in general. It’s difficult to think of reasons to support this view when the political leaders in question have rejected the continuation of the ceasefire and never tire of reaffirming their support for a fight to death with the Jewish state.

Of course, killing as many Hamas leaders as possible wouldn’t stop the rockets and wouldn’t stop arms from being imported into Gaza, still less would it bring an end to Hamas itself. However, carried out with élan, thoroughness and over a sufficient period of time, such a policy would considerably undermine the viability of Hamas as a political movement, at least in its present form. It would also have some disruptive effect on its military operations too.

I haven’t mentioned Gilad Shalit in these considerations as I think that Israeli policy in Gaza can’t turn on the fate of one individual.