Over at Open Democracy there’s a good piece by John C. Hulsman recommending some practical steps Barack Obama could take to bring about a deal between Israel and the Palestinians. The gist of his argument is that the sort of negotiations that have been dragging on between the parties since Oslo are unlikely to get anywhere and that what are required now are fairly rapid and largely secret negotiations aimed at producing a deal that takes care of all the crunch issues in one go.
Most of what he says make sense, but like many other writers on this subject he can’t resist dragging in examples from Irish history that, when looked at closely, offer little or nothing in the way of guidance on the current situation in the Middle East.
What instead we are shooting for is a sober cost-benefit analysis by both Palestinians and Israelis that both gain just more than they lose by such an agreement - such as happened during the negotiations between Lloyd George and Michael Collins in 1921 to establish a settlement in Ireland. That is the best that men can do. Do not hold out for a perfect settlement that simply does not exist; embrace a moderately good one that makes political stakeholders of the majority of the peoples and leaders of both sides.
Well, one can only agree with the general sentiment expressed here. However, he doesn’t mention the fact that the signing of the Treaty led to a split in the IRA and a bloody Civil War which was won by the pro-Treaty side only after it had received help from the British and resorted to methods of considerable briskness; and all this despite the Treaty having been approved by the Dáil and a subsequent general election producing a majority of pro-Treaty deputies.
What price a final settlement deal between Israel and the Palestinians that is followed by the PA and Israel going to war against and smashing Hamas? One’s powers of imagination are not unduly strained to visualize the likely reaction from the beautiful souls of international dinner party opinion.
Later on in his piece Hulsman says,
…this means the more moderate leadership in Hamas must be engaged, even though this makes reaching an accord far more difficult. As proved true in the Good Friday agreement, the Irish Republican Army and the majority of the Protestant paramilitaries, however difficult, could not be excluded from a final settlement, as no deal without them represented the collective will of Northern Ireland.
I’ve had my say on the uselessness of the analogy with Good Friday Agreement here already so I won’t repeat myself. Let me just add that it wasn’t very difficult to get the Protestant paramilitaries to participate in the Good Friday negotiations as those that weren’t entirely creatures of the British national security apparatus were heavily penetrated and influenced by it.
And one more thing: where is the more moderate leadership in Hamas hiding?
I’m very happy to see this point made so well here, Eamonn, and your previous assessment of the absurdity of an Irish analogy was terrific. The most damning indictment of the strained comparison, I think, comes in your point that Irish republicanism, for all its sins and sordid corners, was and is an expression of enlightenment ideas about national emancipation (and I would add anti-imperialism). Sensible or not, right or wrong, its demands were and are recognizable and comprehensible from the perspective of universal values and international norms. The same can be found among the Palestinian leadership, but Hamas, as you you point out, is another story altogether, and as you also point out, the republican movement never demanded the Britain and the British people be wiped from the face of the earth.
“It’s kind of hard to imagine any of the leadership of Hamas visiting the grave of any Jew for any purpose whatsoever.”
Aye and aye.
Cheers,
TG
Thanks.