Daniel Levy works for a think tank. This is a little odd because, judging by some of the things he says here, thinking does not appear be his forte.

…sixty years after the establishment of the state, and alongside all its accomplishments, the onus is now on Israel and its founding ideology, Zionism, to demonstrate in practice that it can be non-expansionist in territorial terms toward its neighbors, and that it can confer genuine equality on the non-Jewish citizens of the state.

Perhaps Daniel has forgotten that Israel, as a result of the peace deal with Egypt, withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula (conquered in 1967 and defended at immense cost in blood in 1973,) gave up territory when it settled with Jordan and pulled out of Lebanon in 2000. Furthermore, whatever one might say about the security fence, and even allowing for the fact that some Palestinian territory is on the Israeli side of it, it’s hardly the work of an expansionist power. I’d say that a brief consideration of these facts would satisfy any impartial observer that Israel not only can be, but has repeatedly been, “non-expansionist in territorial terms towards its neighbors.”

With regard to Israel’s duties to its non-Jewish citizens, Daniel almost makes a reasonable point. Of course Israel has a duty to ensure the greatest possible measure of equality for all its citizens; the same goes for all democratic countries. Why, though, and to whom, does it have to demonstrate that this is what it is doing? It’s hard to be sure about why Daniel thinks this but, reading his remarks in the context of the whole interview, it seems reasonable to suppose he believes that such a demonstration would be helpful in achieving peace between Israel and those of its neighbors with whom it is still in conflict.

So let me see if I have got this right: Daniel thinks that the likes of Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad are worried about the discrimination suffered by Israeli Arabs, and that an amelioration of their situation would improve the possibility of Israel settling its differences with countries like Iran and Syria. Just a bit of beefing up for Israel’s positive discrimination targets for the civil service, say, and the mullahs would come over all sweet and cuddly, while the Syrians would start getting a bit more flexible on the details of the coming peace deal. Yeah, I believe it.

The fun doesn’t end there. He later says,

As for the PA, Gaza, etc., virtually everything we have done so far in supposedly strengthening the moderates and intervening on behalf of one side has been either counter-productive or ineffective. One can’t marginalize Gaza –it’s part of the two-state solution. And we’re most certainly going to have to bring Hamas inside the tent to make this work. I think that’s doable and the first imperative for the U.S. is to leave the Palestinians to do their own internal politics, and to reconstitute their own reformed national movement. I’m not suggesting U.S. mediation, but the removal of what amounts to a U.S. veto on Palestinian national reconciliation. Our basic demand from a newly unified Palestinian national leadership should be: no use of terror and agreement on an authorized interlocutor for U.S.-mediated peace talks with Israel.

I think the comment about Hamas can be translated into plain English like this: “Gaza is governed by an organization that will have no truck with Israel, that desires and proclaims its intention to destroy Israel, that has a large regional sponsor that is attempting to acquire the means to destroy Israel, that is deeply antisemitic in nature and hostile to Jews throughout the world and it makes no attempt to hide any of this. I find this situation a bit too much for me and I’m unwilling to think seriously about what to do about it. “

As I’ve said repeatedly on this blog, there’s no sense to negotiation with Hamas on issues of substance while they believe that that they have a military option for obtaining their goals. In this conflict, as in so many similar ones, it’s not a question of a choice between using force and negotiating, it’s a question of the appropriate use of force such as to allow worthwhile negotiations to take place.

Daniel also claims that attempts to strengthen moderate Palestinian elements have been counterproductive or ineffective. It’s hard to say because we can’t rewind the tape of history to find out what would happened to the PA in the West Bank had it not been supported by Israel, the EU and US. I’d say though, that it was a fair guess that Hamas would have had a fighting chance of controlling the West Bank by now and that Kassam rockets would have landed on more sensitive parts of Israeli territory than Sderot. I wonder if Daniel thinks that that is an outcome that would have favored the negotiating of a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

And a final flight of fancy,

I would argue that the smartest move Israel could make regarding Lebanon would be to remove those excuses (or reasons) that Hezbollah uses to justify its maintenance of an independent armed capacity that actually resonate inside Lebanese politics. What would that mean? Israel could hand over the Shebaa Farms (which are of no value and which Israel has no intention of keeping anyway), could start ending IDF over flights of Lebanon, and could allow the Lebanese armed forces to equip itself as a more serious national army (although not with offensive capacities that would threaten Israel). These measures would create a situation whereby Hezbollah would be faced with a dilemma, as its justifications for its current military posture would be removed. Hezbollah would then have to rely on external explanations (such as the Palestinian cause), or risk being seen as explicitly serving an Iranian, not Lebanese, agenda.

Israel hands over the Shebaa Farms and ends reconnaissance flights and in return it gets a comprehensive peace treaty? Nope, nothing of the sort. It takes these measures because doing so would face Sheik Nasrallah with a dilemma; he’d not be able to get a wink of sleep at night worrying that the world would now think that his militia was serving the cause of Iran and/or was more interested in Palestine and Palestinians than Lebanon and the Lebanese. As a result of being placed in this terrible position and the accompanying emotional and spiritual turmoil, I’m certain that he’d seek help from a psychologist, resign the leadership of his movement and encourage its members to throw their arms away and devote themselves exclusively to prayer and good works.

Can it possibly be that Daniel has never heard a speech of Nasrallah’s calling for Israel to be destroyed? Has he never heard of Hezbollah’s claim to further territory in northern Israel? Does he think that the sort of weapons that Hezbollah deployed in the Second Lebanon War can be bought in car boot sales in south Beirut? Does he really believe that withdrawing from the Shabaa Farms and stopping reconnaissance flights would satisfy them? I doubt it. It’s just so much easier to avoid thinking about inconvenient facts.

I can’t conclude without mentioning that he does say some things of value, particularly with regard to the urgent need to end the colonization of the West Bank. However, Pollyannaish arguments, like the bulk of those presented by Daniel in this interview, do nothing to serve that urgent goal.