Comments on: The Yom Kippur War 35 Years On http://blog.z-word.com/2008/10/the-yom-kippur-war-35-years-on/ Commentary about Zionism, anti-Zionism, antisemitism and the conflict in the Middle East Thu, 09 Feb 2012 11:58:41 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5-RC1.1 By: Jacob http://blog.z-word.com/2008/10/the-yom-kippur-war-35-years-on/#comment-1875 Jacob Sun, 02 Nov 2008 23:03:49 +0000 http://blog.z-word.com/?p=400#comment-1875 I wasn't talking about "Israeli leadership" (which was pretty bad too), I was talking about the MILITARY leadership, the Generals. As Generals come, they were an especially clueless sorry bunch. They were terrible by any military standard. This is a point rarely made or understood. I wasn’t talking about “Israeli leadership” (which was pretty bad too), I was talking about the MILITARY leadership, the Generals.
As Generals come, they were an especially clueless sorry bunch. They were terrible by any military standard. This is a point rarely made or understood.

]]> By: Eamonn McDonagh http://blog.z-word.com/2008/10/the-yom-kippur-war-35-years-on/#comment-1594 Eamonn McDonagh Mon, 13 Oct 2008 11:40:24 +0000 http://blog.z-word.com/?p=400#comment-1594 Jacob: Israeli leadership wasn't perfect. Leadership in war never is; it's about making less crtical errors than the enemy. E Jacob: Israeli leadership wasn’t perfect. Leadership in war never is; it’s about making less crtical errors than the enemy.

E

]]> By: Jacob http://blog.z-word.com/2008/10/the-yom-kippur-war-35-years-on/#comment-1593 Jacob Mon, 13 Oct 2008 09:26:51 +0000 http://blog.z-word.com/?p=400#comment-1593 A point not made here is the utter failure of the Israeli military leadership to understand and prepare for the war that came. I'm not talking about anticipation, or intelligence failure, which, of course, was colosal, too. I'm talking about the total lack of awareness of the nature and methods of the military attack coming. There were no countermeasures or moves planned and drilled. A total lack of understanding, on part of most Israeli high commanders of what happened in the first hours and days of the war, a total mental freeze and inability to adapt and counteract. The state of unpreparedenes was criminal. Many of the big brass and commentators don't understand what happened to this day. The "don’t get cocky" thing has two parts: don't underestimate the enemy, don't overestimate your own generals and leaders. If the Israeli generals were half as good as they were thought to be, the initial success of Egypt and Syria would not have happened, and the losses of Israel would have been much lower. A point not made here is the utter failure of the Israeli military leadership to understand and prepare for the war that came.
I’m not talking about anticipation, or intelligence failure, which, of course, was colosal, too.
I’m talking about the total lack of awareness of the nature and methods of the military attack coming. There were no countermeasures or moves planned and drilled. A total lack of understanding, on part of most Israeli high commanders of what happened in the first hours and days of the war, a total mental freeze and inability to adapt and counteract. The state of unpreparedenes was criminal. Many of the big brass and commentators don’t understand what happened to this day.
The “don’t get cocky” thing has two parts: don’t underestimate the enemy, don’t overestimate your own generals and leaders.
If the Israeli generals were half as good as they were thought to be, the initial success of Egypt and Syria would not have happened, and the losses of Israel would have been much lower.

]]> By: Ben http://blog.z-word.com/2008/10/the-yom-kippur-war-35-years-on/#comment-1584 Ben Sat, 11 Oct 2008 04:50:33 +0000 http://blog.z-word.com/?p=400#comment-1584 "The military and political leadership of Israel was taken by surprise because over the preceding years they had convinced themselves that the Arab states had no viable military option open to them to recover the territory lost in the Six Day War." This is only partly true. Not everyone was in agreement with this evaluation. Some knew that the front lines were vulnerable. Others believed that the Egyptians and Syrians were planning to attack. Israel had on several occasions in the preceding year declared a state of high military alert, and had called up reservists when it seemed the Egyptians might attack. One day we will know whether these preventative measures stopped any planned attacks. The outcome of the earlier War of Attrition was that Egyptian anti-aircraft missile batteries controlled the airspace of a wide belt on the East side of the Suez canal, and severely restricted the ability of IAF operations in that area. As a consequence the garrison forts along the canal became a military millstone rather than a strategic defence line. The two Ariks, Sharon and Tal, both understood the implications of this outcome of the War of Attrition, even if others did not, and knew that the Egyptians did have a military option as long as Israel did not utilize the strategic depth of the Sinai properly. On the Golan front, the small size of the tank forces that were assigned to the task of holding that line was deeply dispiriting to the young conscripts who were deployed there. In the months preceding the war they expressed, in remarkably restrained but a deeply affecting manner, their knowledge that in any attack they would be overwhelmed and overrun, and that this outcome was the understood and accepted strategy of the high command and Government. When war arrived, they were almost all killed, as they had predicted. A bigger force there would have effectively held off the Syrians. “The military and political leadership of Israel was taken by surprise because over the preceding years they had convinced themselves that the Arab states had no viable military option open to them to recover the territory lost in the Six Day War.”

This is only partly true. Not everyone was in agreement with this evaluation. Some knew that the front lines were vulnerable. Others believed that the Egyptians and Syrians were planning to attack.

Israel had on several occasions in the preceding year declared a state of high military alert, and had called up reservists when it seemed the Egyptians might attack. One day we will know whether these preventative measures stopped any planned attacks.

The outcome of the earlier War of Attrition was that Egyptian anti-aircraft missile batteries controlled the airspace of a wide belt on the East side of the Suez canal, and severely restricted the ability of IAF operations in that area. As a consequence the garrison forts along the canal became a military millstone rather than a strategic defence line. The two Ariks, Sharon and Tal, both understood the implications of this outcome of the War of Attrition, even if others did not, and knew that the Egyptians did have a military option as long as Israel did not utilize the strategic depth of the Sinai properly.

On the Golan front, the small size of the tank forces that were assigned to the task of holding that line was deeply dispiriting to the young conscripts who were deployed there. In the months preceding the war they expressed, in remarkably restrained but a deeply affecting manner, their knowledge that in any attack they would be overwhelmed and overrun, and that this outcome was the understood and accepted strategy of the high command and Government. When war arrived, they were almost all killed, as they had predicted. A bigger force there would have effectively held off the Syrians.

]]> By: Fabian from Israel http://blog.z-word.com/2008/10/the-yom-kippur-war-35-years-on/#comment-1570 Fabian from Israel Thu, 09 Oct 2008 12:46:31 +0000 http://blog.z-word.com/?p=400#comment-1570 Good post! Good post!

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