There is an article by Marko Attila Hoare at Harry’s Place here. I’d like to deal with some questions arising from its first paragraph.

Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has reportedly gloated over the Russian crushing of Georgia as a defeat for Israel. ‘[Israeli brigadier-general] Gal Hirsch, who was defeated in Lebanon, went to Georgia and they too lost because of him.’

Gal Hirsch is not a Brigadier General in the IDF. He is a reserve Brigadier General in the IDF. It’s not a small difference and the reason why he is not on active service is that he resigned from it after the Second Lebanon War. He did so because the Almog enquiry into the kidnapping of Regev and Goldwasser concluded that

soldiers under Hirsch’s command committed operational errors before, during and after the kidnapping on July 12.

Realizing that at best he would never receive an operational command again and that at worst he might face disciplinary action, Hirsch decided to hand in his cards and sell his skills in the private sector.

The only reason that Hirsch was available to advise the Georgians was precisely because an IDF enquiry had found him unfit for further command. General Udi Adam, the Northern Front commander and Dan Halutz, the Chief of Staff of the IDF also decided to jump before they were pushed as a result of the IDF’s failures in the war. If you receive a command in the IDF and fail to give a decent account of yourself when it really matters, there is every possibility you’ll pay a price. Civilian politicians paid a price for failure too; Amir Pertez lost the leadership of the Labour Party as a result of the war and even though he has managed to remain in office since, Ehud Olmert suffered a grave loss of authority after the war and saw his hopes of reelection as prime minister disappear.

In Lebanon, by contrast, there has been no commission of inquiry into how the war started and how well it was conducted. No one with decision-making authority has had to answer searching questions about their conduct, risk public opprobrium or been obliged to seek alternative employment. The Second Lebanon War was a resounding success for Hezbollah because, among other reasons, those who made the decisions which led to its outbreak and were in leadership positions during the fighting have deemed it to be so and are not about to let anyone else question that judgment.

Nasrallah’s crowing is, therefore, devoid of logic. While his rhetoric scales new heights of self-congratulation every time he opens his mouth, the Israelis get on with the unglamorous and difficult business of demanding accountability from their leaders.

Another important point to bear in mind there’s little new about Israel’s enemies announcing the demise of the IDF as an effective fighting force. The failed post-independence reprisal raids, Karameh and the 1973 surprise attack by Egypt and Syria are just three examples of events that led to a crisis of confidence at home and much gloating abroad.

Yet, however inconsistently and haltingly, in each those cases those perceived as responsible for the failures were removed and lessons were learned.

Democratic countries, especially in the information age, suffer from many disadvantages when it comes to fighting wars. Something not too far removed from the truth has to be told to the population, journalists ask awkward questions, one’s own soldiers may cause difficulties if they feel that their leaders have served them badly and there any number of legal requirements to be taken into consideration with regard to the treatment of civilians and so forth. Nevertheless, they have one critical advantage over dictatorships; mechanisms exist that allow them to learn from their errors. Gal Hirsch’s activities in Georgia should be source of worry for Nasrallah and not an occasion for boasting.